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INTRODUCTION 
ny examination of the law of class actions must begin with the 
idea of due process. Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
are collectively built on this idea as explicitly stated in Rule 1: “These 
rules . . . should be construed, administered, and employed by the court 
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and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding.”1 Rule 23 is and should 
be viewed from that same due process perspective. So we begin with a 
brief consideration of the idea and the law of due process. 
The law of due process is the product of judicial decisions enforcing 
the texts of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses 
to the United States Constitution as limitations on government action.2 
The lodestar opinions are Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust3 and 
Mathews v. Eldridge,4 which set forth the foundational ideas and 
contours of due process. Generally stated, the law of due process sets 
flexible baseline standards of government obligation whenever a 
person’s right to life, liberty, or property is put at risk by government 
action. The presumption underlying due process—premised on the 
perceived effectiveness of the adversarial system—is that no person 
should suffer a deprivation of those protected interests in the absence 
of timely notice and an opportunity to be heard. Deviations from this 
presumptive norm, subject to certain limits and safeguards, are 
dependent on a consideration of the nature and scope of the deprivation, 
the legitimate interests of the government, and the truth-seeking 
effectiveness of the procedure offered, including any reasonably 
available alternatives. 
But the idea of due process is much broader than this judicially 
imposed limitation on power. It is premised on a profound but tempered 
commitment to the rule of law, reasonably and fairly applied, and a 
concomitant distrust of the exercise of arbitrary power. It also bespeaks 
an equitable and sensible flexibility and places its faith in the 
adversarial system’s capacity to approximate the truth and deliver 
justice. Its hallmarks are reasonableness, impartiality, and respect for 
both the rights of the individual and the legitimate needs of the 
community. One might say that the aim of due process is justice 
reasonably, fairly, and efficiently pursued.5 
Of course, reasonable minds can and will differ as to what 
constitutes due process, both philosophically and as a matter of law. 
The lens of due process will not lead to an obvious solution in any but 
the most obvious cases. But that lens should provide a perspective 
1 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
2 See generally Simona Grossi, Procedural Due Process, 13 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 155 
(2017). 
3 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
4 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
5 See id. 
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through which to engage the debate on the value and effectiveness of 
any particular procedural rule or standard. It will, at the very least, point 
to the right questions and, eventually, to the solutions that are optimal 
for the system and for the just resolution of individual claims of right 
that the system is there to provide.  
This idea of due process permeates (or should permeate) our civil 
justice system. Thus, while not every nook and cranny of procedural 
law is itself required by the law of due process, which establishes only 
the floor below which the law cannot operate, the vast body of 
procedural law should be interpreted and applied through the much 
more inclusive idea of due process. This idea may be thought of as a 
type of high vaulted ceiling that reaches skyward, toward the ideal of 
true justice, but with its feet planted solidly on a foundation of 
reasonable standards and realistic expectations. That is the theme of 
this Article as applied in the particular context of class actions.  
The law of class actions—which focuses largely on Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 236 and judicial interpretations of that rule—is 
necessarily bounded by the law of due process. But it was also 
conceived within the more inclusive idea of due process. Rule 23 
should, accordingly, be interpreted with the idea of due process as its 
driving force.7 This Article begins with an examination of the 
fundamental principles of due process and shows how those principles 
have permeated our system of justice and, more particularly, the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We then proceed to examine the text 
of Rule 23 from its original form to its most current iteration, using the 
idea of due process as our interpretive guide. Finally, we will examine 
several Supreme Court decisions interpreting Rule 23. Our goal here is 
to study those decisions from the perspective of due process. 
I 
THE IDEA OF DUE PROCESS 
The idea of due process, like the law of due process, can be traced 
to a vast array of ancient texts and traditions,8 but a critical pivot point 
is certainly the Magna Carta. By signing that charter in 1215 at the 
behest of a group of rebellious barons, King John acceded to the basic 
6 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.  
7 See Simona Grossi, Frontloading, Class Actions, and a Proposal for a New Rule 23, 
21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 921 (2017). 
8 See, e.g., Deuteronomy 19:15–20, Proverbs 31:9, Psalms 106:3, Romans 4:15, 5:13; 
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (C.D.C. Reeve trans., 1998) (384–323 B.C.); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 
(B. Jowett trans., 2003) (381 B.C.). 
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rule-of-law proposition that no person—no matter how exalted—was 
above the law, and that all free persons were entitled to the evenhanded 
protection of the law. 
The Magna Carta was reaffirmed, revised, and expanded in 1227 
during the reign of Henry III. The new charter provided, 
No Freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his 
Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or 
any other wise destroyed; nor will We not pass upon him, nor 
condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of 
the Land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any 
man either Justice or Right.9  
The word “Freeman” applied broadly, including both sexes and serfs 
(with some limits). In subsequent acts of Parliament, the phrase “law 
of the land” was replaced with “due process of law.” This alteration of 
text was meant to endorse the same rule-of-law principle established in 
the Magna Carta and represent the same quest for a just system of 
laws.10 As Sir Edward Coke explained in his explication of the revised 
charter, 
No man shall be disseised, that is, put out of seison, or dispossessed 
of his free-hold (that is) lands, or livelihood, or of his liberties, or free 
customes, that is, of such franchises, and freedomes, and free 
customes, as belong to him by his free birth-right, unlesse it be by the 
lawfull judgement, that is, verdict of his equals (that is, of men of his 
own condition) or by the Law of the Land (that is, to speak it once 
for all) by the due course, and processe of Law.11  
Neither the Magna Carta nor subsequent acts of Parliament defined 
the ultimate scope of due process (or justice) or set the permanent metes 
and bounds of those principles. However, they established the principle 
that no free person could be deprived of his or her basic rights in the 
absence of the due operation of established law and provided that a 
9 II THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 848 (Steve 
Shepard ed., 2003) (1606) [hereinafter SIR EDWARD COKE]. 
10 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 
(1855); see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 663 (1833) (“Lord Coke says, that these latter words, per legem terrae (by the law 
of the land,) mean by due process of law, that is, without due presentment or indictment, 
and being brought in to answer thereto by due process of the common law.”). It is true that 
the phrase “due process of law” technically referred to writs and forms of the law (process), 
but writs and forms defined the content of the law of the land. Cf. RODNEY L. MOTT, DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW 87–95 (1973) (emphasizing the “process” aspect of the phrase, but failing 
to see the relationship between process and substantive law). 
11 SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 9, at 849. 
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carefully wrought system of rights and obligations could become the 
vehicle for seeking some semblance of justice. 
Over the next several centuries, the system of common law pleading 
emerged and evolved into a highly formalistic method of civil dispute 
resolution.12 Under this regime, in the specific context of civil 
litigation, the idea of due process was embodied largely in the forms of 
action and in the attendant system of issue pleading.13 But the 
common law system became increasingly formalistic and, as a result, 
occasionally elevated the rule of law—both procedural and 
substantive—above its rightful station.14 Of course, the forms were not 
dictated by due process and, judged by today’s standards, the 
serpentine processes of issue pleading would likely fall short of our due 
process ideals. Yet the system itself reflected, albeit imperfectly, the 
idea of due process to the extent that it precluded (or was perceived to 
preclude) arbitrary deprivations of protected rights. It adhered to the 
rule of law and permitted impositions on individual rights only in 
accord with the established processes of that law. 
The rule-of-law principle established in the Magna Carta was a 
response to unaccountable despotism. But it was not (nor should it be 
seen as) an invitation to elevate the law above reason and justice, which 
is to say above the idea of due process. Rather, the rule-of-law principle 
is meant to create a path to justice. A system of oppressive or arcane 
laws, whether they be procedural or substantive, can be as despotic as 
an unaccountable tyrant. Ideally, a system of laws should operate as 
one component of a larger system of justice—one that is neither 
despotic nor subject to any form of permanence or rule-of-law 
orthodoxy. To do justice, the law needs some breathing space. This is 
the role of equity. 
Equity, which arose in the fifteenth century as an alternative method 
of dispute resolution, was an implicit due process critique of the then 
extant common law system. Where the common law demanded strict 
adherence to formality, equity offered a more open-textured 
alternative. Where the common law gave no remedy for an apparent 
injustice, the Chancellor could devise one. In short, where the common 
law was frozen and could not provide justice, equity would do so by 
12 For a brief overview of the common law system, see ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. 
MAY, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS 561–70 (4th ed. 2012). 
13 See SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 9, at 848–73. 
14 For a valuable historical overview of the common law system, see I DAVID DUDLEY 
FIELD, SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 
233–36 (A.P. Sprague ed., 1884). 
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moving forward—perhaps only in small, carefully measured steps—
but forward nonetheless.  
Of course, equity had its flaws. As with all systems, equity became 
barnacled with technicalities. But equity, whatever its ultimate 
strengths and weaknesses, grew naturally out of the idea of due process 
by aiming to do justice when existing procedures were incapable of 
doing so. We typically think of the equitable principle of “no adequate 
remedy at law” as a limit on access to equity. However, “no adequate 
remedy at law” is better seen as an invitation to allow justice when the 
law has failed to do so. 
In America, the nineteenth-century movement to reform code 
pleading—inspired largely by the work of David Dudley Field—was 
undoubtedly premised on a widely shared perception that the Anglo-
American legal system had become incapable of delivering the promise 
of due process. In Field’s words, “[A]t this moment we are in a state in 
which justice is virtually denied to great numbers of people. Speedy 
justice is a thing unknown; and any justice, without delays almost 
ruinous, is most rare.”15 The civil litigation system was not, in other 
words, a system through which justice could be reasonably, fairly, and 
efficiently achieved. Field’s goal, which he pursued with energy, 
passion, and some degree of success, was to simplify procedure by 
creating an accessible, unitary system of justice premised on a scientific 
examination of existing procedures and the adoption of what he 
described as a realistic, natural system shorn of unnecessary 
complexity.16 Thus, in contrast to the arcane rules of common law 
pleading where “[j]ustice is entangled in the net of forms,”17 under the 
Field Code, “the pleadings would naturally fall into a plain, short 
statement by each party, of his own case.”18 
15 Id. at 226, 229 (“natural scheme of legal procedure”). Field may have been a visionary, 
but his vision was premised on a realistic appraisal of the flaws in the system under which 
he labored and the possibilities of the new: “There will never be an administration of the 
law without delay and without expense. The question is really one of degree. How good can 
we make that which cannot be perfect? How much of the delay, how much of the expense, 
and how much of the uncertainty can we remove?” Id. at 225. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 228. 
18 Id. at 230; see also id. at 233 (“This form of pleading is natural. The plaintiff states 
his cause of action. The defendant gives his answer to it.”); id. at 240 (“Let the plaintiff set 
forth his cause of action in his complaint briefly, in ordinary language, and without 
repetition; and let the defendant make his answer in the same way. Let each party verify his 
allegation by making oath that he believes it to be true. The complaint will then acquaint the 
defendant with the real charge, while the answer will inform the plaintiff of the real defense. 
The disputed facts will be sifted from the undisputed, and the parties will go to trial knowing 
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As Field himself recognized, however, the practice of law is highly 
resistant to change.19 The codes fell victim to the lingering, formalistic 
habits of lawyers and judges trained in the common law. This was 
particularly evident in the context of pleadings, where Field’s vision of 
a “plain, short statement” devolved into the still-elusive distinctions 
drawn between ultimate facts, evidentiary facts, and conclusions of 
law.20 Moreover, the code phrase “cause of action” became mired in 
the law of primary rights and in the imposition of formal rules that 
treated the pleadings as an end in themselves.21 Thus, Field’s goal of 
creating a pragmatic procedural system that advanced the idea of due 
process was stymied (or at least hobbled) by the siren song of 
formalism.22 
Reformers of the twentieth century, chief among them being Charles 
E. Clark, sought to return code pleading to its core project of creating 
an elegant procedural system premised on natural lawyering and 
judging. Theirs was a due process mission, for they sought to create a 
system of procedure under which justice could reasonably and 
realistically be pursued.23 That system would be a means to justice, not 
an end in itself. The monument to their project was the adoption of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules) in 1938. The Rules were 
simple, pragmatic, and designed to work. They borrowed from Field—
his “plain, short statement” became Rule 8(a)(2)’s “short and plain 
statement”—and applied his philosophy to their perception of the then 
current best practices.24 Rule 1 of the new Federal Rules required that 
the Rules “be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action.”25 In other words, the Rules were to be 
what they have to answer. The plaintiff will state his case as he believes it, and as he expects 
to prove it. The defendant, on his part, will set forth what he believes and expects to 
establish, and he need set forth no more.”). 
19 Id. at 225. 
20 See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 231 (2d ed. 
1947). The State of California adheres to the code pleading model. As to the “still elusive” 
nature of the distinction, the current version of one of California’s leading practice 
manuals—Continuing Education of the Bar—offers the following observation: “The 
distinctions between ultimate facts, conclusions, and evidentiary facts, however, are not 
always easy to draw and often are a matter of degree.” CONTINUING EDUC. OF THE BAR, 
CALIFORNIA CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 15.26 (2018). 
21 Charles E. Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 33 YALE L.J. 817, 820–22 (1924). 
22 Id. at 819–20. 
23 Id. at 823–24. 
24 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
25 SENATE, RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES WITH INDEX AND NOTES, S. DOC. NO. 101, at 1 (1st Sess. 1939). 
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interpreted and applied to advance the idea and ideals of due process: 
justice reasonably, fairly, and efficiently pursued.  
II 
RULE 23 
A. The Original Rule 
The Rules provided a pragmatic and liberal approach to joinder of 
claims and parties, including party joinder through the device of class 
actions when the usual forms of joinder were otherwise inadequate.26 
The text of the original rule, which relied substantially on former 
Equity Rule 38,27 was succinct: 
Rule 23. Class Actions. 
(a) REPRESENTATION. If persons constituting a class are so 
numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all 
before the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly 
insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of 
all, sue or be sued, when the character of the right sought to 
be enforced for or against the class is 
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the 
owner of a primary right refuses to enforce that 
right and a member of the class thereby becomes 
entitled to enforce it; 
(2) several, and the object of the action is the 
adjudication of claims which do or may affect 
specific property involved in the action; or 
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or 
fact affecting the several rights and a common 
relief is sought. 
. . . . 
(c) DISMISSAL OR COMPROMISE. A class action shall not be 
dismissed or compromised without the approval of the 
court. If the right sought to be enforced is one defined in 
paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of this rule notice of the 
proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all 
members of the class in such manner as the court directs. If 
the right is one defined in paragraphs (2) or (3) of 
subdivision (a) notice shall be given only if the court 
requires it.28 
26 See id. at Rules 13–14, 18–25, 18–20, 24–30. 
27 Id. at 240. 
28 Id. at 27–28. 
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The Advisory Committee offered three illustrations of subsection 
(a)(1): (1) “actions brought by or against representatives of an 
unincorporated association;” (2) actions “to enforce rights held in 
common by policyholders against the corporate issuer of the policies;” 
and (3) “suit[s] by stockholders to enforce a corporate right.”29 To 
illustrate subsection (a)(2), the notes mentioned “[a] creditor’s action 
for liquidation or reorganization of a corporation.”30 Finally, with 
respect to subsection (a)(3), the notes cited several cases in which a 
class representative sought injunctive relief on a question common to 
the class.31 Ultimately, the actions mentioned in the notes were not 
particularly innovative because each was premised on previously 
recognized equitable practices in state and federal courts.32  
One aspect of original Rule 23 might strike a modern reader as 
curious. While Rule 23(c) required notice of any proposed dismissal or 
compromise in an action filed under (a)(1), “neither rule (a)(2) nor 
(a)(3) required such notice.” This might appear anomalous as to (a)(3), 
since that section seems to be a more inclusive category and one likely 
to trigger the due process rights of potential class members. The 
explanation for this lacuna is, however, simple: judgments in (a)(3) 
actions were binding only on class members who chose to intervene. In 
other words, (a)(3) actions were not, in fact, representative suits as that 
phrase is now commonly understood.33 Thus, the actual scope of the 
original class action rule was quite narrow and far from visionary. And 
although the original rule purported to apply to both legal and equitable 
proceedings, the recognized types of class actions seemed to fall most 
naturally into the equitable category. 
29 Id. at 241 (alteration in original). 
30 Id. at 242 (alteration in original). 
31 See id. at 241. 
32 See William Wirt Blume, The “Commons Questions” Principle in the Code Provision 
for Representative Suits, 30 MICH. L. REV. 878 (1932). 
33 As explained in the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendment of Rule 23: 
The “spurious” action envisaged by original Rule 23 was in any event an anomaly 
because, although denominated a “class” action and pleaded as such, it was 
supposed not to adjudicate the rights or liabilities of any person not a party. It was 
believed to be an advantage of the “spurious” category that it would invite 
decisions that a member of the “class” could, like a member of the class in a “true” 
or “hybrid” action, intervene on an ancillary basis without being required to show 
an independent basis of Federal jurisdiction, and have the benefit of the date of the 
commencement of the action for purposes of the statute of limitations.  
Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 39 F.R.D. 69, 99 
(1966) [hereinafter 1966 Amendments]. 
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In operation, Rule 23 proved to be unsatisfactory and of limited 
utility in a rapidly morphing world of litigation practices. The Rule 
was, as Clark had predicted, too “restrictive.”34 Other committee 
members agreed with him and had endorsed a more flexible approach 
to the rule.35 The full committee, however, opted for a less promising, 
equity-driven text. By doing so, the drafters locked class actions into 
narrow, preexisting categories. Those three categories—denominated 
respectively as “true,” “hybrid,” and “spurious”—proved difficult to 
define and unpredictable in application.36 Moreover, rather than 
promoting flexibility, many courts adhered to the familiar patterns that 
predated the rules, thus freezing class actions in their place.  
The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 amendments to the 
Federal Rules detail the perceived deficiencies of the original rule.37 In 
a sense, the original Rule 23 operated as a due process promise to be 
fleshed out at some future date. But in practice, the Rule did not deliver 
on that promise. 
B. A Constitutional Marker 
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Hansberry v. Lee, 
although not premised on Rule 23, brought the idea and law of due 
process to the forefront of the jurisprudence of representative suits.38 
The plaintiffs in that case sought to enforce a racially restrictive 
covenant against an African American buyer and the seller of a home 
that was arguably subject to the covenant.39 The defendants asserted 
that the covenant was not enforceable since, as required by its terms, 
34 See U.S. Supreme Court Advisory Committee Rules for Civil Procedure: Proceedings 
903 (Nov. 17, 1935) (unpublished archive) (on file with Manuscripts and Archives, Yale 
University Library, in Charles Edward Clark Papers, Box 94, Folder 4) (At the November 
17, 1935, meeting of the Advisory Committee, Clark observed, “I think the Equity rule itself 
is greatly desirable to avoid . . . because I am afraid that the Equity rule is clearly 
restrictive.”). 
35 See id. at 872 (Commenting on the optimal text of a provision governing class actions, 
Warren Olney, an attorney and one of the members of the Advisory Committee on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, observed, “We ought to leave that to the court, and leave 
it flexible, so that they can apply the reasons—apply a reasonable rule and apply it, perhaps, 
progressive rules as time goes on in connection with it.”). 
36 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 249–57 (1950) (detailing the 
judicial struggle to interpret and apply Rule 23). 
37 1966 Amendments, supra note 33, at 98–99; see also Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing 
Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 
81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 375–85 (1967). 
38 311 U.S. 32 (1940). 
39 Id. at 37–38. 
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ninety-five percent of the landowners had not endorsed it.40 The suit 
was filed in an Illinois state court.41 The plaintiffs argued that the 
question of enforceability had been resolved affirmatively in a prior 
representative suit to which the defendants, as members of the 
representative class, were bound.42 The Illinois Supreme Court agreed 
with the plaintiffs and enforced the covenant.43 
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned that decision.44 The 
Hansberry Court described representative suits as constituting a well-
recognized exception to the general principle that only parties to an 
action are bound by the court’s judgment.45 However, that exception 
must satisfy due process. Thus, the procedure adopted in a 
representative action must “fairly insure[] the protection of the 
interests” of the absent class members.46 In the Court’s words, “It is 
familiar doctrine of the federal courts that members of a class not 
present as parties to the litigation may be bound by the judgment where 
they are in fact adequately represented by parties who are present.”47 
The Court found that adequate representation was wanting in 
Hansberry because the plaintiffs in the initial action, who were seeking 
to enforce the covenant, did not have a shared interest with those 
property owners who opposed enforcement.48 In other words, 
adequacy of representation requires at a minimum a common interest 
with a shared goal. While due process would be satisfied when such is 
the case, 
[i]t is quite another to hold that all those who are free alternatively 
either to assert rights or to challenge them are of a single class, so 
that any group merely because it is of the class so constituted, may 
be deemed adequately to represent any others of the class in litigating 
their interests in either alternative. Such a selection of representatives 
for purposes of litigation, whose substantial interests are not 
necessarily or even probably the same as those whom they are 
deemed to represent, does not afford that protection to absent parties 
which due process requires.49 
40 Id. 
41 Lee v. Hansberry, 24 N.E.2d 37, 38 (Ill. 1939). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 39–40. 
44 Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 46. 
45 Id. at 41. 
46 Id. at 42. 
47 Id. at 42–43. 
48 Id. at 44 (holding that the “procedure and the course of litigation sustained here by the 
plea of res judicata do not satisfy” the requirement of adequate representation). 
49 Id. at 45. 
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We might say that the demands of justice supersede the goal of 
efficiency when the purported representatives of the class do not share 
a common interest and goal with the class. We should also note that the 
Hansberry Court was not imposing a stringent dogma of due process 
that insisted on individual autonomy or any other principle other than 
the need for adequate representation. 
C. The Current Rule—1966 and Beyond 
The 1966 amendments to Rule 23 weren’t truly amendments. They 
were dramatic revisions of the Rule that produced a wholesale 
replacement of the original rule and ushered in a new era of class 
actions. The amendments created a new framework that took class 
actions beyond the narrow confines of the original rule. Their 
ostensible goal was to make class actions more readily available when 
other joinder devices proved inadequate to the mission of a 
“just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding.”50  
As is well known, Rule 23(a) established the prerequisites to certify 
a class (numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy), while 
Rule 23(b) described the types of representative actions that could 
qualify as a class action.51 Subsections (c) through (e) offered guidance 
as to the procedures to be followed in class action litigation.52  
Rule 23 has been amended several times since 1966, most recently 
in 2017.53 However, the basic structure of the 1966 amendments 
remains at the core of the Rule, and subsections (a) and (b) still operate 
as the gateways to certification.  
1. Rule 23(a)
The 1966 Advisory Committee’s discussion of Rule 23(a) is spare;
it essentially reiterates what is provided by the new text and notes that 
satisfaction of these prerequisites is necessary, but not sufficient, to 
justify class certification.54 To our thinking, though, subsection (a) 
deserved a more thoughtful elaboration. The Committee’s discussion 
leaves one with the impression that the Rule imposes a mechanical 
checklist and, as we will see, that is precisely how the Supreme Court 
50 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
51 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
52 Id. 
53 See 1966 Amendments, supra note 33, at 103. 
54 Id. at 100. 
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approaches subsection (a). But, in fact, subsection (a) embodies a 
profound principle of due process, specifically, the principle articulated 
by the Court in Hansberry. There, the Court saw representative suits as 
a pragmatic alternative to the usual rules of joinder that allowed a court 
to “proceed to a [binding] decree in suits where the number of those 
interested in the subject of the litigation is so great that their joinder as 
parties in conformity to the usual rules of procedure is 
impracticable.”55 The availability of that pragmatic alternative was, 
however, qualified by the requirement of adequate representation.56 
If we read Rule 23(a) through the lens of Hansberry, we see not a 
four-part checklist—each part carrying the weight of its own doctrinal 
standards—but rather the embodiment of the principles of due process. 
The coupling of numerosity with impracticability descends directly 
from the Hansberry decision. Pragmatic numerosity justifies a 
deviation from the usual rules of joinder and promotes the due process 
principles of fairness and efficiency by providing a method through 
which to adjudicate claims that would otherwise lie fallow. Similarly, 
Rule 23(a)’s requirements of commonality, typicality, and adequacy 
are directly drawn from the Hansberry Court’s insistence, as a matter 
of due process, that the class representative share a common interest 
with the class members.57 
What we have, therefore, is not a four-part test but a series of factors 
that inform the preliminary due process evaluation for class 
certification. In essence, those factors assist us in answering two 
straightforward questions. First, given the size of the potential class and 
taking account of other relevant practical considerations (e.g., 
geographic dispersion, cost effectiveness, lack of realistic alternatives), 
is a class action an appropriate alternative to the usual rules of joinder? 
Second, do the class members and their named representative share a 
common interest that will ensure the adequacy of representation? In 
short, Rule 23(a) invites an application of Hansberry and its vision of 
the due process of law.  
2. Rule 23(b)
Having satisfied subsection (a), a party seeking class certification
must show that the proposed class fits into one or more of the three 
55 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940). 
56 See id. at 42–43. (“[M]embers of a class not present as parties to the litigation may be 
bound by the judgment where they are in fact adequately represented by parties who are 
present . . . .”). 
57 Id. at 42, 44–45. 
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types described in subsection (b).58 Subsection (b)(1) operates as a 
class action version of Rule 19(a) and advances similar due process 
concerns by avoiding practical prejudice to an existing party or to a 
person who ought to be a party. As the Advisory Committee explained, 
subsection (b)(1)(A) is available when “[o]ne person may have rights 
against, or be under duties toward, numerous persons constituting a 
class, and be so positioned that conflicting or varying adjudications in 
lawsuits with individual members of the class might establish 
incompatible standards to govern his conduct.”59 And subsection 
(b)(1)(B) will apply to “situations where the judgment in a nouclass 
[sic] action by or against an individual member of the class, while not 
technically concluding the other members, might do so as a practical 
matter.”60 Thus, subsection (b)(1) comfortably advances the idea of 
due process by providing a joinder device through which justice can be 
reasonably, fairly, and efficiently pursued in the particular contexts 
covered by its two parts. To the extent due process is further implicated 
by a (b)(1) certification, it would be so on an as-applied basis. 
Rule 23(b)(2) has a broader sweep. It applies when “the party 
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply 
generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding 
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”61 In 
the Committee’s words,  
This subdivision is intended to reach situations where a party has 
taken action or refused to take action with respect to a class, and final 
relief of an injunctive nature or of a corresponding declaratory nature, 
settling the legality of the behavior with respect to the class as a 
58 The current version of Rule 23(b)(1), subject only to stylistic alterations from the 
original text, provides: 
A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if: 
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would 
create a risk of: 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class 
members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party 
opposing the class; or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical 
matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties 
to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their 
ability to protect their interests . . . . 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1). 
59 1966 Amendments, supra note 33, at 100. 
60 Id. at 100–01. 
61 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (noting that the current version contains only stylistic 
alterations from the original text). 
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whole, is appropriate. Declaratory relief “corresponds” to injunctive 
relief when as a practical matter it affords injunctive relief or serves 
as a basis for later injunctive relief. The subdivision does not extend 
to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or 
predominantly to money damages.62 
Thus, (b)(2) is about injunctive relief, but quite clearly the 
Committee anticipated that money damages would not be foreclosed 
in a (b)(2) action so long as damages weren’t the exclusive or 
predominant remedy. In any event, the Committee cites civil rights 
actions as a paradigmatic example of a (b)(2) case.63 It is not clear, 
however, why civil rights actions, such as school desegregation cases, 
couldn’t be easily and obviously certified under subsections (b)(1)(A) 
or (B). For example, a school district faced with multiple desegregation 
suits could find itself subject to incompatible orders, thereby satisfying 
(b)(1)(A). And the unnamed members of a potential class of parents or 
students could certainly suffer the type of practical prejudice (b)(1)(B) 
is designed to avoid. Little effort should be required to establish that 
civil rights class actions, such as school desegregation cases or prison 
condition cases, promote the idea of due process by providing a fair 
and efficient method through which to vindicate the rule of law (and 
particularly constitutional law). The Committee, however, elides this 
topic. Why (b)(2) was necessary to that mission is unclear. 
The Advisory Committee offers a second type of action falling 
within the contours of (b)(2): 
an action looking to specific or declaratory relief . . . brought by a 
numerous class of purchasers, say retailers of a given description, 
against a seller alleged to have undertaken to sell to that class at prices 
higher than those set for other purchasers, say retailers of another 
description, when the applicable law forbids such a pricing 
differential.64 
Interestingly, the Committee does not mention consumer litigation, and 
focuses instead on ordinary business disputes. This type of action 
would not fall naturally into either of the (b)(1) categories. It also 
involves some form of monetary relief.65 The potential due process 
concerns arising in this second type are of a different order than those 
pertaining to civil rights actions. Unlike civil rights cases, where the 
ultimate relief sought is collective and an end in itself, the ultimate 
62 1966 Amendments, supra note 33, at 102. 
63 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 361 (2011) (endorsing this view). 
64 1966 Amendments, supra note 33, at 102. 
65 The third type of (b)(2) suit cited by the Committee—class action challenging an 
unlawful tie-in—would also seem to fit neatly within the contours of (b)(1)(A). Id. 
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relief in this second type is neither collective nor an end in itself. The 
end is some form of compensation or restitution to each member of the 
class. Surely some consideration of the due process ramifications for 
this distinct type of (b)(2) class was warranted. The Committee’s 
deficiency here seems particularly unfortunate in light of the well-
documented lawyer-driven abuse that such consumer class actions have 
generated.66 Additionally, given subsection (b)(3) and its safeguards, 
why the Committee saw (b)(2) as the proper vehicle for this second 
type of action, as opposed to (b)(3), remains unclear. 
Subsection (b)(3)67 applies where “class-action treatment is not as 
clearly called for,”68 essentially taking us into the realm of 
individualized monetary damages. The text of the rule, then and now, 
reflects substantial due process concerns by imposing a heightened 
efficiency requirement (predominance and superiority) and by 
requiring, via subsection (c)(2), detailed notice to the class members, a 
right to be excluded, and an alternative right to participate through 
counsel.69 The due process legacy of each of these requirements is 
palpable, though the Committee has little to say on this topic.  
66 See Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking the 
American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 434–35 (2014). 
67 The current version of Rule 23(b)(3), subject only to stylistic alterations from the 
original text, provides: 
A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if . . . the court finds 
that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to 
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The 
matters pertinent to these findings include: (A) the class members’ interests in 
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the 
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or 
against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the 
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in 
managing a class action. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
68 1966 Amendments, supra note 33, at 102. 
69 The original Rule (c)(2) provided that in (b)(3) actions “the court shall direct to the 
class members the best notice practicable under the circumstances” 1966 Amendments, 
supra note 33, at 97–98. The notice was required to inform the class member of the right to 
be excluded from the class, of the fact that the member will be bound by the judgment in the 
absence of such a request, and if no such request is made, of the right of the member to 
appear in the action through counsel. Id. at 98. In this way, subsection (c)(2) directly 
embraced the class member’s due process rights to pursue his or her own claim 
independently and, alternatively, to appear through counsel in an action in which his or her 
rights would be at stake. The current versions of subsection (c)(2)(B) provide an even more 
thorough list of this due-process-premised notice requirement. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 
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In fact, the Advisory Committee’s commentary to subsection (b)(3) 
is cryptic and noncommittal.70 We can’t resist quoting the Committee’s 
discussion of predominance in full: 
The court is required to find, as a condition of holding that a class 
action may be maintained under this subdivision, that the questions 
common to the class predominate over the questions affecting 
individual members. It is only where this predominance exists that 
economies can be achieved by means of the class-action device. In 
this view, a fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of 
similar misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a class 
action, and it may remain so despite the need, if liability is found, for 
separate determination of the damages suffered by individuals within 
the class. On the other hand, although having some common core, a 
fraud case may be unsuited for treatment as a class action if there was 
material variation in the representations made or in the kinds or 
degrees of reliance by the persons to whom they were addressed. A 
“mass accident” resulting in injuries to numerous persons is 
ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood 
that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and 
defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in 
different ways. In these circumstances an action conducted nominally 
as a class action would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits 
separately tried. Private damage claims by numerous individuals 
arising out of concerted antitrust violations may or may not involve 
predominating common questions.71 
Beyond the first two sentences, which make perfect sense, it’s hard to 
know what to make of the Committee’s guidance. It goes something 
like this: predominance might be satisfied here, but maybe not, and it 
typically won’t be satisfied there, but who knows, and it might or might 
not be satisfied in this other context, which is only marginally 
distinguishable from the first two. In the Committee’s defense, the 
discussion of superiority is lucid and especially so in light of the non-
70 The current version of Rule 23(b)(3), subject only to stylistic alterations from the 
original text, provides: 
A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if . . . the court finds 
that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to 
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The 
matters pertinent to these findings include: (A) the class members’ interests in 
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the 
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or 
against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the 
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in 
managing a class action. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
71 1966 Amendments, supra note 33, at 103 (citation omitted). 
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exhaustive factors listed in subdivisions (b)(3)(A)–(D).72 No wonder 
courts have struggled with the elusive concept of predominance.73 The 
Committee’s inexplicable and negative reference to mass torts is also 
quite unfortunate and seems to short-circuit the possibility that class 
actions could prove a useful device in that context.  
We’re still struggling with the tension between the Committee’s 
descriptions of (b)(2) and (b)(3). As to (b)(2), according to the 
Committee, a class can seek monetary damages so long as those 
damages aren’t the exclusive or predominant remedy. Presumably, the 
questions pertaining to the injunctive or declaratory relief must 
predominate over the damages claims. But under (b)(3), the common 
questions must also predominate over any individualized claims for 
monetary relief. Sounds remarkably similar. It could be that (b)(2) 
would only be appropriate for what we now identify as incidental 
damages and that (b)(3) would potentially be available for 
individualized damages (i.e., when the individual questions pertaining 
to those damages do not predominate). 
Various other provisions of the original rule attended to the due 
process principles of fairness and efficiency, including subsection (d)’s 
outline of the various orders a court might enter during the pendency 
of the class action.74 Similarly, subsection (e) addressed itself, albeit 
cryptically, to the due process concerns arising in the context of class 
action settlements. Thus, “[a] class action shall not be dismissed or 
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the 
proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the 
class in such manner as the court directs.”75  
Rule 23(d) remains largely as originally conceived, but the newly 
adopted version of Rule 23(e) adds significant detail to the duties of the 
court and to the rights of class members (and potential class members) 
in the context of the settlement, voluntary dismissal or compromise of 
a certified class action, or of an action proposed to be certified for 
purposes of settlement.76 In other words, the new Rule 23(e) is 
anything but cryptic. The express aim of providing this detailed and 
72 Id. at 97, 103–04. 
73 Well these are the same folks who brought us the textual somersaults of Rule 19. 
74 1966 Amendments, supra note 33, at 97 (original text), 106 (“Subdivision (d) is 
concerned with the fair and efficient conduct of the action and lists some types of orders 
which may be appropriate.”). The current version of Rule 23(d) largely replicates the 
original rule. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(1), (2). 
75 1966 Amendments, supra note 33, at 105. 
76 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)–(5). 
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rigorous approach to class-related settlements was to secure the due 
process rights of class members.77 As the 2017 Advisory Committee 
phrased it, “The central concern in reviewing a proposed class-action 
settlement is that it be fair, reasonable, and adequate.”78  
More generally, from the text of Rule 23 and the commentary 
provided by the 1966 Advisory Committee (including Professor 
Kaplan’s additional post-Committee commentary), it’s not clear that 
the Committee had a completely coherent plan.79 The Committee saw 
the shortcomings of the original class action rule and definitely 
envisioned a more expansive role for the new rule. But how this new 
rule would, or should, work in practice seems not to have been fully 
understood, except in certain contexts where it did nothing more than 
replicate accepted practices. In terms of due process, the Committee 
did lock in some individual autonomy guarantees (e.g., opt out in (b)(3) 
actions) but didn’t fully examine the due process possibilities that 
might be advanced by a more robust application of subsections (b)(2) 
and (b)(3). Due process should also take into account what we might 
call the rights of group autonomy. Like the original Advisory 
Committee, the 1966 Committee seemed to be looking backward at 
what worked and not forward toward the possibilities of collective 
action in a rapidly evolving litigation world. Of course, (b)(3) was 
correctly seen as inventive. But it was also shackled at birth by what 
appears to have been a lack of confidence in its possibilities and an 
overweening desire to adhere to the individual autonomy model of due 
process. 
The current Rule 23 contains a number of other provisions designed 
to advance the idea of due process. For example, subsection (g) offers 
detailed guidance as to the appointment and duties of class counsel, a 
concern that was once deemed inherent in the due process requirement 
of adequacy of representation under Rule 23(a)(4).80 Relatedly, 
subsection (h) provides guidance to the court as to the award of 
attorney’s fees.81 In general, Rule 23(a)–(h) can be seen as a reflection 
of the principles of due process as they occur in modern class action 
litigation. Those provisions, therefore, should not be treated as stand-
alone concepts that invite an untethered form of doctrinal analysis. 
77 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, 119–27 (April 2017), https://www.uscourts. 
gov/sites/default/files/2017-04-civil-agenda_book.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MA2-4AMZ]. 
78 Id. at 123. 
79 Kaplan, supra note 37, at 385–400. 
80 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g). 
81 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h). 
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Rather, the idea of due process should form the foundation of any 
interpretation or application of Rule 23. 
3. The Rule in the Court’s Jurisprudence
Since the 1966 amendments, the Supreme Court has issued
numerous decisions interpreting and applying Rule 23. Some of those 
decisions embraced the idea of due process while others did not. 
Reviewing a sampling of those decisions might help us identify the 
problems in the current jurisprudence of Rule 23 and formulate ideas 
for adjusting our approach to class actions, with the goal of making 
Rule 23 more truthful to the idea of due process. 
4. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor
At issue in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor was the certifiability
of a proposed settlement class purporting to resolve a broad spectrum 
of present and future asbestos-related claims.82 The settlement was 
intended to bind both symptomatic and asymptomatic persons who had 
been exposed to the defendants’ products. The district court certified a 
settlement class, but the Third Circuit reversed.83 The defendants 
sought review in the Supreme Court. 
The backstory of the settlement provides an important context to the 
Supreme Court’s decision affirming the Third Circuit.84 Asbestos-
related litigation started as something of a trickle in the 1960s, but as 
the science and law became increasingly favorable to the plaintiffs, the 
trickle turned into to a river that overflowed its banks, eventually 
leading to litigation delays and stalemates, bankruptcies, and thousands 
of victims who were either under- or uncompensated. As to the 
numbers, “[f]rom 1980 through 1983, between 4,165 and 4,879 claims 
were filed every year. Between 1984 and 1987, filings more than 
quadrupled (to 21,056 per year). Thereafter, with the exception of 
1989, the yearly claims rate fluctuated between 22,752 and 29,883 
through 1994.”85 This deluge of asbestos cases affected both state and 
federal courts. 
After a series of aborted efforts to control the crisis, including urgent 
calls to Congress to intervene, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
82 Id. 
83 Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996). 
84 For a fascinating and detailed account of the asbestos litigation crisis and the process 
through which the settlement was achieved, see Patrick M. Hanlon, An Experiment in Law 
Reform: Amchem Products v. Windsor, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1279 (2013). 
85 Id. at 1286 (emphasis added). 
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Litigation attempted to address the federal side of the crisis by 
consolidating all pending federal asbestos cases before a single judge 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.86 After lengthy and complicated negotiations, the parties 
eventually arrived at a settlement and sought to certify a settlement 
class.87 The proposed class included the following individuals: 
(a) All persons (or their legal representatives) who have been exposed 
in the United States or its territories (or while working aboard U.S. 
military, merchant or passenger ships), either occupationally or 
through occupational exposure of a spouse or household member, to 
asbestos or to asbestos-containing products for which one or more of 
the defendants may bear legal liability and who, as of January 15, 
1993, reside in the United States or its territories, and who have not, 
as of January 15, 1993, filed a lawsuit for asbestos-related personal 
injury or damage, or death in any state or federal court against the 
defendant(s) (or against entities for whose actions or omissions the 
defendant(s) bear legal liability). 
(b) All spouses, parents, children, and other relatives (or their legal 
representatives) of the class members described in paragraph 1 above 
who have not, as of January 15, 1993, filed a lawsuit for the asbestos-
related personal injury, or damage, or death of a class member 
described in paragraph 1 above in any state or federal court against 
the defendant(s) (or against entities for whose actions or omissions 
the defendant(s) bear legal liability).88 
As so defined, the class potentially included “hundreds of thousands, 
perhaps millions, of individuals.”89 
The accompanying settlement was comprehensive, detailed, and 
purported to bind all persons who had been exposed to asbestos 
manufactured by the defendant companies, regardless of whether those 
persons were currently symptomatic of an asbestos-related disease. 
Described generally, the settlement created an administrative system 
through which persons suffering from one or more of four specified 
asbestos-related afflictions could receive compensation within a preset 
range specified for the particular disease or diseases at issue. As to 
asymptomatic exposure-only claimants, the settlement provided 
potential relief but no inflation adjustment or any accommodation for 
scientific developments that might indicate as yet unforeseen 
86 Id. at 1298; Windsor, 521 U.S. at 599. 
87 Windsor, 521 U.S. at 599–602. 
88 Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 716, 721 (E.D. Pa. 1994), rev’d, 83 
F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996). 
89 Windsor, 521 U.S. at 597. 
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consequences of exposure to asbestos.90 The Court’s description of the 
settlement is both acontextual and stated at a very general level. One 
must look to Justice Breyer’s concurring and dissenting opinion for a 
more precise understanding of the complexities of the agreement and 
the various trade-offs that made the settlement possible:91 
[C]ertain details of the settlement that are not discussed in the 
majority opinion suggest that the settlement may be of greater benefit 
to future plaintiffs than the majority suggests. The District Court 
concluded that future plaintiffs receive a “significant value” from the 
settlement due to a variety of its items that benefit future plaintiffs, 
such as: (1) tolling the statute of limitations so that class members 
“will no longer be forced to file premature lawsuits or risk their 
claims being time-barred”; (2) waiver of defenses to liability; (3) 
payment of claims, if and when members become sick, pursuant to 
the settlement’s compensation standards, which avoids “the 
uncertainties, long delays and high transaction costs [including 
attorney’s fees] of the tort system”; (4) “some assurance that there 
will be funds available if and when they get sick,” based on the 
finding that each defendant “has shown an ability to fund the payment 
of all qualifying claims” under the settlement; and (5) the right to 
additional compensation if cancer develops (many settlements for 
plaintiffs with noncancerous conditions bar such additional claims). 
For these reasons, and others, the District Court found that the 
distinction between present and future plaintiffs was “illusory.”92  
Part III of the Court’s opinion provides a prosaic description of Rule 
23, essentially tracking the 1966 Advisory Committee’s Notes.93 Here 
the Court embraces much of the Advisory Committee’s timidity with 
respect to subsection (b)(3) and seems to relegate (b)(3) actions to low-
stakes cases in which individual class members do not have 
economically litigable claims. At the very least, in the Court’s view, 
the higher the stakes, the more likely it is that common questions will 
not predominate and that individual actions will remain superior to 
class actions. Thus, “[w]hile the text of Rule 23(b)(3) does not exclude 
from certification cases in which individual damages run high, the 
Advisory Committee had dominantly in mind vindication of ‘the rights 
of groups of people who individually would be without effective 
strength to bring their opponents into court at all.’”94 This approach, 
whether it is definitive or merely presumptive, invites a mechanical and 
90 Id. at 602–05. 
91 Id. at 638–39 (Breyer, J., concurring and dissenting). 
92 Id. at 638 (citations omitted). 
93 See id. at 613–19. 
94 Id. at 617 (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 
497, 497 (1969)). 
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rigid reading of predominance, treating (b)(3) as nothing more than an 
efficiency tool for low-stake cases. 
The Court opens the application portion of its opinion—part IV—by 
ruling that while a settlement agreement cannot displace the class-
qualifying criteria of subsections (a) and (b), the terms of a settlement 
should inform the application of those subsections.95 In short, the 
fairness of the settlement cannot itself justify certification, though the 
substance of the settlement is relevant in determining whether the class-
qualifying criteria have been established.96 The Court was unanimous 
on this point. But the majority’s application of the principle seems 
lackadaisical at best. 
As to predominance, the Court instructs the reader that the question 
is whether the class is “sufficiently cohesive.”97 However, the Court 
only explained that term’s meaning as another way of saying that the 
common questions should predominate.98 More to the point, the Court 
does not examine the terms of the settlement—as the court said it 
should—to inform the predominance inquiry. Nor does the Court 
examine efficiencies that might be advanced by settling a wide range 
of claims—as the court said it should—many of which would have 
transaction costs beyond their value. Instead, the Court simply and 
cryptically says that there are too many individual issues, and then 
notes that the court of appeals thought so as well.99 In the end, the class 
is just too “sprawling.”100  
But the question the Court should have asked, by its own reckoning, 
was whether the settlement adequately navigated the individual issues 
in a manner that showed that the critical question—the health 
consequences of asbestos exposure—retained its predominance, both 
as a pre- and postsettlement matter. By way of contrast, Justice Breyer, 
concurring and dissenting, endorses and employs a pragmatic, detailed 
examination of the settlement and a more accurate assessment of 
predominance. His more detailed and realistic approach certainly gives 
95 Id. at 619–22. 
96 Id. at 621. 
97 Id. at 623. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 623–24. 
100 Id. at 624. 
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one a very different sense of the case and of the utility and fairness of 
the proposed class-based settlement.101  
The Court was troubled by the fact that the class, which included 
both symptomatic and asymptomatic members, reflected an inherent 
conflict of interest between those two groups, thus failing to satisfy the 
standards of Rule 23(a)(4).102 The evidence of this conflict was the 
claim by some objectors that the funds allocated in the settlement 
disadvantaged the asymptomatic exposure-only members of the class 
by, among other things, failing to include an adjustment for inflation. 
101 Id. at 631–35. Justice Breyer’s realistic assessment of the complexities facing the 
parties and district court also provided a much-needed context for any evaluation of the 
settlement agreement: 
Delays, high costs, and a random pattern of noncompensation led the Judicial 
Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation to transfer all federal 
asbestos personal-injury cases to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in an effort 
to bring about a fair and comprehensive settlement. It is worth considering a few 
of the Committee’s comments. See Judicial Conference Report 2 (“‘Decisions 
concerning thousands of deaths, millions of injuries, and billions of dollars are 
entangled in a litigation system whose strengths have increasingly been 
overshadowed by its weaknesses.’ The ensuing five years have seen the picture 
worsen: increased filings, larger backlogs, higher costs, more bankruptcies and 
poorer prospects that judgments—if ever obtained—can be collected” (quoting 
Rand Corporation Institute for Civil Justice)); id. at 13 (“The transaction costs 
associated with asbestos litigation are an unconscionable burden on the victims of 
asbestos disease.” “[O]f each asbestos litigation dollar, 61 cents is consumed in 
transaction costs. . . . Only 39 cents were paid to the asbestos victims” (citing Rand 
finding)); (“Delays also can increase transaction costs, especially the attorneys’ 
fees paid by defendants at hourly rates. These costs reduce either the insurance 
fund or the company’s assets, thereby reducing the funds available to pay pending 
and future claimants. By the end of the trial phase in [one case], at least seven 
defendants had declared bankruptcy (as a result of asbestos claims generally”)). 
Although the transfer of the federal asbestos cases did not produce a general 
settlement, it was intertwined with and led to a lengthy year-long negotiation 
between the cochairs of the Plaintiff’s Multi-District Litigation Steering 
Committee (elected by the Plaintiff’s Committee Members and approved by the 
District Court) and the 20 asbestos defendants who are before us here. These 
“protracted and vigorous” negotiations led to the present partial settlement, which 
will pay an estimated $1.3 billion and compensate perhaps 100,000 class members 
in the first 10 years. “The negotiations included a substantial exchange of 
information” between class counsel and the 20 defendant companies, including 
“confidential data” showing the defendants’ historical settlement averages, 
numbers of claims filed and settled, and insurance resources. “Virtually no 
provision” of the settlement “was not the subject of significant negotiation,” and 
the settlement terms “changed substantially” during the negotiations. In the end, 
the negotiations produced a settlement that, the District Court determined based on 
its detailed review of the process, was “the result of arms-length adversarial 
negotiations by extraordinarily competent and experienced attorneys.”  
Id. at 632. 
102 Id. at 626–27. 
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This point certainly has the patina of credibility. But that credibility 
fades with the realization that some of the named plaintiffs were 
asymptomatic and presumably negotiated from that perspective and, 
more importantly, when one examines the settlement at a more detailed 
level and considers the various trade-offs made during the negotiations. 
Again, Justice Breyer’s opinion provides a window into that 
possibility.103  
From a due-process perspective, the Court’s opinion falls woefully 
short. It is not clear that anyone’s due process interests were furthered 
by this decision: not the plaintiffs’ (both symptomatic and 
asymptomatic), not the defendants’, not the community’s, and not the 
judicial system’s. Instead of treating Rule 23 as an opportunity to 
ameliorate a litigation (and human) crisis, the Court treated the rule as 
a barrier to that opportunity. An alternative approach would have been 
to ask whether, given the nature of the crisis and the precise contours 
of the negotiations and settlement, Rule 23 could be interpreted or 
applied in a manner that advanced the idea of due process: 
reasonableness, fairness, and efficiency.104 Ultimately, the Court’s 
message to lower courts was don’t be adventuresome, don’t be too 
enthusiastic, and don’t be a problem solver.105  
5. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.
Fibreboard Corporation was a timber company manufacturing a
variety of products containing asbestos, mainly for high-temperature 
industrial applications.106 In the flood of asbestos litigation, Fibreboard 
was sued by an increasing number of personal injury plaintiffs. After 
litigating with its two potential insurers—Continental Casualty 
Company and Pacific Indemnity Company107—a California state trial 
court in 1990 held the two insurers responsible for indemnification as 
to any claim by a claimant exposed to Fibreboard asbestos products and 
required the insurers to pay the full cost of defense for each claim 
103 See id. at 638–39 (Breyer, J., concurring and dissenting); see supra text 
accompanying note 102. 
104 To be contrasted with the Court’s nervous approach to Rule 23 is the bold and 
successful Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, which had the benefit of not relying on Rule 23 
but on the apparently more flexible bankruptcy law. See Georgene M. Vairo, Georgine, the 
Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, and the Rhetoric of Mass Tort Claims Resolution, 31 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 79, 85 (1997). 
105 Windsor, 521 U.S. at 628–29. 
106 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 822 (1999). 
107 Id. 
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covered.108 While an appeal was pending, Fibreboard started 
approaching the plaintiffs who had filed claims against it and offered 
to settle such claims.109 Initially, the settlements provided a payment 
of forty percent of the plaintiffs’ claims up front and the balance 
contingent upon a successful resolution of the insurance coverage 
dispute.110 However, with the increasing pace of the filings against it, 
Fibreboard began settling cases by assigning its rights against 
Continental, providing no initial payment, and offering a figure about 
twice the nominal amount of earlier settlements.111 Then the company 
decided to embark on global settlement negotiations with the remaining 
plaintiffs.112 Having lost at the trial court level on the coverage dispute, 
Continental joined the global settlement negotiations, but “conditioned 
its part in any settlement on a guarantee of ‘total peace.’”113 Thus, the 
parties started talking about the feasibility of a mandatory class action 
that would bind all potential plaintiffs without giving them any choice 
to opt out.114 After several months, the parties finally agreed on a 
$1.535 billion global settlement, with $1.525 billion of this sum coming 
from Continental and Pacific and $10 million to be paid by 
Fibreboard.115 The parties agreed to identify unsettled present claims 
against Fibreboard and set aside a then unspecified fund to resolve 
them.116 They also agreed that any excess left in that fund would be 
distributed to class claimants.117 At the insistence of plaintiffs’ counsel, 
Fibreboard and its two insurers also entered into the “Trilateral 
Settlement Agreement,” under which “[t]he two insurers agreed to 
provide Fibreboard with . . . $2 billion to defend against asbestos 
claimants and pay the winners” in case the global settlement agreement 
failed to win approval.118  
On September 9, 1993, in an attempt to secure funds sufficient for 
compensation, a group of personal injury plaintiffs filed an action in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas 
seeking certification for settlement of a mandatory class comprising 
108 Id. at 822–23. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 823. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 824. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 824–25. 
116 Id. at 825. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
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three groups: (1) “all persons with personal injury claims against 
Fibreboard for asbestos exposure who had not yet brought suit or 
settled their claims before” August 27, 1993;119 (2) those persons “who 
had dismissed such a claim but retained the right to bring a future action 
against Fibreboard; and [(3)] ‘past, present, and future spouses, parents, 
children, and other relatives’ of class members exposed to Fibreboard 
asbestos.”120 Thus, the class did not include claimants with actions still 
pending against Fibreboard “or claimants ‘who filed and, for cash 
payment or some other negotiated value, dismissed claims against 
Fibreboard, and whose only retained right [was] to sue Fibreboard upon 
development of an asbestos-related malignancy.’”121  
Continental and Pacific sought and obtained leave to intervene as 
defendants in the action.122 “The District Court provisionally granted 
class certification, enjoined commencement of further separate 
litigation against Fibreboard by class members, and appointed a 
guardian ad litem to review the fairness of the settlement to the class 
members.”123  
Under the settlement agreement, in exchange for full releases from 
class members, Fibreboard, Continental, and Pacific would establish a 
trust to process and pay class members’ asbestos personal injury and 
death claims.124 Claimants seeking compensation were required to try 
to settle with the trust.125 “If initial settlement attempts failed, 
claimants would have to proceed to mediation, arbitration, and a 
mandatory settlement conference.”126 Then, only after exhausting that 
process, defendants could sue the trust, subject to a limit of $500,000 
per claim, “with punitive damages and prejudgment interest barred.”127 
The “claims resolved without litigation would be discharged over three 
years, while judgments would be paid out over a 5-to-10-year 
period.”128 The “[a]greement also contained spendthrift provisions to 
119 The insurance companies’ appeal of the consolidated coverage case had been set to 
be heard on August 27, 1993; see id. at 824. 
120 Id. at 825–26. 
121 Id. at 826–27. 
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conserve the trust, and provided for paying more serious claims first in 
the event of a shortfall in any given year.”129  
The district court cited the risk that Fibreboard might lose or fare 
poorly on appeal of the insurance coverage case or “lose the 
assignment-settlement dispute, leaving it without funds to pay all 
claims.”130 Consequently, after an eight-day fairness hearing, the court 
certified the class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) “and approved the settlement 
as ‘fair, adequate, and reasonable’” under Rule 23(e).131 The district 
court dismissed the objectors’ argument that the absence of a limited 
fund precluded certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), finding that there 
was no such restriction under the Rule, and that, if there was one, the 
case would still qualify.132  
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s opinion upholding its 
limited funds theory on the consideration “that Fibreboard [was facing] 
enormous potential liabilities and defense costs that would likely equal 
or exceed the amount of damages paid out.”133 Judge Smith dissented 
on the basis of what he perceived to be major due process flaws in the 
majority opinion.134  
Soon after, the Supreme Court decided Amchem and vacated and 
remanded the Fifth Circuit’s judgment for further consideration in light 
of that decision.135 On remand, in a brief per curiam opinion, the Fifth 
Circuit again affirmed, distinguishing Amchem on the grounds that 
Amchem was a Rule 23(b)(3) action, whereas Fibreboard was a Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) action.136 Judge Smith again dissented, rejecting the 
majority’s limited fund theory because the fund had been made limited 
by the settlement itself.137 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
reversed.138  
The opinion of the Court, authored by Justice Souter, opened with 
the very powerful consideration that, “[l]ike Amchem[,] . . . this case is 
a class action prompted by the elephantine mass of asbestos cases, and 
our discussion in Amchem will suffice to show how this litigation defies 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 827. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 828. 
133 Id. at 829. 
134 Id. at 920–30. 
135 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
136 In re Asbestos Litig., 134 F.3d 668, 669–70 (5th Cir. 1998). 
137 Id. at 671–74. 
138 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 830 (1999). 
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customary judicial administration and calls for national legislation.”139 
The Court noted that “[t]he Advisory Committee did not envision 
mandatory class actions in cases like this one, and both the Rules 
Enabling Act and the policy of avoiding serious constitutional issues 
counsel against leniency in recognizing mandatory limited fund actions 
in circumstances markedly different from the traditional paradigm.”140 
But,  
[a]ssuming, arguendo, that a mandatory, limited fund rationale could 
under some circumstances be applied to a settlement class of tort 
claimants, it would be essential that the fund be shown to be limited 
independently of the agreement of the parties to the action, and 
equally essential under Rules 23(a) and (b)(1)(B) that the class 
include all those with claims unsatisfied at the time of the settlement 
negotiations, with intraclass conflicts addressed by recognizing 
independently represented subclasses.141  
Thus, the Court found the application of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) to be 
inappropriate in this case.142 
As in Amchem, Justice Breyer dissented, starting from the same 
premise that had prompted the Court to reverse the Fifth Circuit, that 
is, the idea that the settlement before the Court was part of an 
“elephantine mass of asbestos cases,”143 which “defie[d] customary 
judicial administration.”144 But, according to Justice Breyer, the 
solution to this problem could not be found in “our ‘deep-rooted 
historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.’”145 
And “[it was] the number of these cases, not their nature, that create[d] 
the special judicial problem,”146 so judges had to “search aggressively 
for ways, within the framework of existing law, to avoid delay and 
expense so great as to bring about a massive denial of justice.”147 
Truthful to due process considerations, and with an analysis attentive 
to the reality of litigation and the plaintiffs’ claims of rights, Justice 
Breyer emphasized that the district court’s opinion was grounded in 
446 factual findings, which had properly led the district court to 
conclude that the settlement was equitable, that the potential claimants 
139 Id. at 821. 
140 Id. at 864. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 821; id. at 866 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
144 Id. at 866 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
145 Id. at 868. 
146 Id. at 867. 
147 Id. 
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had been adequately “represented, and that the distinctions drawn 
among the different categories of claimants were reasonable.”148 Those 
findings and conclusions, he noted, had also been affirmed by the Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.149 In other words, the factual findings 
fully showed fairness and efficiency in the resolution of a problem of a 
certain magnitude and, in any event, the alternative to class action 
settlement was not going to be a fair opportunity for each plaintiff to 
litigate.150 It might have been no justice at all.  
Justice Breyer believed this to be a limited fund case within Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) because of the “significant ‘risk’ that the total assets 
available to satisfy the claims of the class members would fall well 
below the likely total value of those claims.”151 As to the potential for 
unequal treatment among the claimants, the district court’s seventy-six 
separate findings of fact pointing to an absence of such unequal 
treatment were enough for Justice Breyer to dispel such concern.152 
Hence, certifying the settlement class would have provided justice 
consistent with due process. We might say that the majority opinion 
disserved the idea of due process, while Justice Breyer fully embraced 
and applied that idea. 
6. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes
The Court’s opinion in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes153 addressed
two aspects of certification under Rule 23: the commonality component 
of subsection (a) and the availability of individualized damages under 
subsection (b)(2).154 
As previously noted, Rule 23(a) deals with two interrelated 
concerns, namely, (1) whether it would make sense to proceed as a 
class action given the size of the class and the overall context of the 
litigation (numerosity), and if so, (2) whether the class members will 
be adequately represented by the named representatives (commonality, 
typicality, and adequacy). The first question played no role in the 
Court’s discussion. Instead, the Court focused on a single component 
148 Id. at 865. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 867–68. 
151 Id. at 871. 
152 Id. at 878. 
153 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
154 Id. at 342. 
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of the second question. In the Court’s words, “[T]he crux of this case 
is commonality.”155  
The Court majority did recognize that commonality was part of an 
integrated inquiry into what we would call the Hansberry question—
namely, the question of whether the class members are (or were) 
adequately represented. In fact, the Wal-Mart Court’s insistence on a 
litigation-driving common contention with a common answer flows 
directly from Hansberry. In Hansberry, the adequacy demanded by due 
process was to be found in a shared goal among the class members and 
their named representative with respect to a litigation-driving issue.156 
The common, litigation-driving question in Wal-Mart was whether the 
defendant’s corporate culture was the proximate cause of a practice or 
pattern of gender-based employment practices.157 The common answer 
or shared goal sought by the class and its representatives was an 
affirmative response to that question.158 To this point, the Wal-Mart 
Court’s opinion accords with the due process character of class actions. 
The opinion goes off the due-process rails, however, when it 
demands significant proof of the plaintiffs’ Title VII theory as an aspect 
of commonality.159 The Court here imposes a doctrine of commonality 
that is untethered from the Hansberry question and the idea of due 
process. The majority, despite its protest to the contrary, transforms 
commonality into a freestanding, merit-based evaluation of the 
common question. One could argue that the majority was simply 
showing that there was no common question since each class member’s 
claim would rise and fall on the discrete facts of her case. But that is 
not correct. The plaintiffs were challenging a perceived pattern or 
practice of discrimination emanating from a male-dominated corporate 
culture, and all members of the class certainly shared the goal of 
establishing that corporate-culture thesis, since doing so would create 
a rebuttable presumption of gender discrimination in their individual 
155 Id. at 349. 
156 See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940). 
157 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 355–58. 
158 Id. at 350–52. 
159 Id. at 349 n.5 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157–58 n.13 
(1982)). The “significant proof ” language was extracted from a footnote in the Falcon 
opinion. That footnote reads more like an aside than it does the creation of a certification 
standard of proof. In the body of the Falcon opinion, the Court focuses on the pleadings as 
the vehicle for measuring commonality. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 158 (“Respondent’s complaint 
provided an insufficient basis for concluding that the adjudication of his claim of 
discrimination in promotion would require the decision of any common question concerning 
the failure of petitioner to hire more Mexican-Americans.”). 
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claims. In the end, the majority simply didn’t believe (or refused to 
believe) that the plaintiffs’ theory could be sustained on the evidence 
presented. This, however, has nothing to do with the Hansberry 
adequacy of representation principle requiring a common contention 
seeking a common answer. The majority’s significant proof 
requirement elided the due process issue that Rule 23(a)(2)–(4) is 
designed to address, and simultaneously undermined the due process 
rights of the class by disposing of the merits of a significant aspect of 
their collective claims at the certification stage.  
The second question presented to the Court was whether a class 
certified under Rule 23(b)(2) could include individualized claims for 
money damages.160 The Court unanimously responded that Rule 
23(b)(2) may not be so used.161 The due process defense of this 
position would focus on the absence of notice and opt-out requirements 
in (b)(2) actions. And from a legislative intent perspective, the 
argument against allowing individualized damages in a (b)(2) class 
action was that the Advisory Committee wouldn’t have wanted (b)(2) 
to be used as an end run around the more demanding requirements 
(b)(3) imposed. But it isn’t clear that these arguments should have 
carried the day. As for the Advisory Committee’s intent, it’s far from 
certain what the Committee truly intended with respect to the 
relationship between (b)(2) and (b)(3). As noted previously, the 
Advisory Committee seemed to have thought that a (b)(2) action could 
include money damages so long as those damages weren’t the 
exclusive or predominant remedy.162  
Justice Scalia rejected this negative inference on the view that the 
Committee wouldn’t have wanted (b)(2) to undermine the standards of 
(b)(3).163 But it is equally likely, and more consistent with the 
Committee’s commentary, that the Committee was unsure of the scope 
of (b)(3) and might well have endorsed some overlap between the two 
subsections. As noted previously, there was clear overlap between 
(b)(1) and (b)(2). 
In any event, from a due process perspective, it’s true that the higher 
standards imposed on (b)(3) certifications are designed to ensure due 
process. But the scope of due process is not predetermined or rigid, as 
the Court so often reminds us. And there certainly could be some cases 
160 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 367–68 (Ginsburg, J., concurring and dissenting). 
161 Id. at 360–61. 
162 Id. at 363. 
163 Id. at 363–64. 
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where the requirement of notice and the right to opt out might outweigh 
other due process concerns, including the community’s rights and 
interests, transaction costs, and efficiency. Hence, a black-letter rule 
limiting the scope of (b)(2) class actions disserves due process by 
demanding a form of acontextual uniformity. A more sensible and due-
process driven approach in Wal-Mart would have confined the ruling 
to address only whether (b)(2) certification was appropriate under the 
precise circumstances of that case.  
7. Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds
At first blush, the Court’s decision in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut
Retirement Plans and Trust Funds appears to flip Justice Scalia’s 
merits-based approach to commonality on its head.164 There has been 
much rejoicing in the majority’s observation: 
Although we have cautioned that a court’s class-certification analysis 
must be “rigorous” and may “entail some overlap with the merits of 
the plaintiff’s underlying claim,” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 
U.S. 338, 351 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted), Rule 23 
grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at 
the certification stage. Merits questions may be considered to the 
extent—but only to the extent—that they are relevant to determining 
whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are 
satisfied.165 
But the Court’s application of the commonality principle was not quite 
as bold as the above quotation might lead one to believe. In fact, 
perhaps as a product of Supreme Court politics,166 the Amgen Court 
added yet another layer to the stand-alone doctrine of commonality, 
creating another microdoctrine over which litigants will find 
themselves splitting hairs. 
The plaintiffs in Amgen filed a securities fraud complaint against 
Amgen, a biotechnology company. Their complaint alleged that 
Amgen’s misrepresentations and omissions materially affected the 
company’s stock price in violation of the Securities and Exchange Act 
of 1934 §10(b) and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5. 
The plaintiffs sought to certify a class of similarly situated investors 
who purchased Amgen stock during the relevant time frame. To prevail 
on their claim, the plaintiffs (and all members of the class) would have 
164 568 U.S. 455 (2013). 
165 Id. at 465–66. 
166 Justice Ginsburg, the author of the majority opinion, needed Justice Alito’s vote to 
secure a majority. 
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to prove the materiality of the challenged misrepresentations and 
omissions. But the plaintiffs hoped to avoid proving individual reliance 
by resorting to the fraud on the market presumption. 
The only issue before the Court was whether the plaintiffs had 
satisfied the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). Amgen 
argued that the plaintiffs were required to prove materiality at the 
certification stage yet failed to do so. The Court rejected that argument 
for two reasons. First, materiality was a common question since it could 
be “proved through evidence common to the class.”167 Second, and 
most importantly, 
there [wa]s no risk whatever that a failure of proof on the common 
question of materiality w[ould] result in individual questions 
predominating. Because materiality is an essential element of a Rule 
10b-5 claim . . . Connecticut Retirement’s failure to present sufficient 
evidence of materiality to defeat a summary-judgment motion or to 
prevail at trial would not cause individual reliance questions to 
overwhelm the questions common to the class. Instead, the failure of 
proof on the element of materiality would end the case for one and 
for all; no claim would remain in which individual reliance issues 
could potentially predominate.168 
We would call this the death knell approach to predominance: if a 
failure to prove is the death knell of the individual claims, 
predominance is satisfied. 
We have no quarrel with the death knell rule as a matter of 
sufficiency, except that Justice Ginsburg seems to be treating it as a 
matter of necessity. Suppose the common question had been fraud on 
the market. A failure to establish that presumption would not have been 
the death knell to individual claims, since each individual could attempt 
to prove actual reliance. Hence, either predominance could not be 
established given the absence of a death knell, or plaintiffs would be 
required to prove fraud on the market prior to certification. In this 
regard, consider Justice Ginsburg’s response to the dissent: 
A failure of proof on the common question of materiality ends the 
litigation and thus will never cause individual questions of reliance 
or anything else to overwhelm questions common to the class. 
Therefore, under the plain language of Rule 23(b)(3), plaintiffs are 
not required to prove materiality at the class-certification stage. In 
other words, they need not, at that threshold, prove that the 
predominating question will be answered in their favor.169 
167 Id. at 467. 
168 Id. at 467–68. 
169 Id. at 468. 
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By inference, the plaintiffs would have to prove their common 
contention at the outset if its failure would not operate as a death knell. 
If that is correct, it follows that a (b)(3) class certification in Wal-Mart 
would have failed the predominance test because failure of the 
corporate-culture thesis would not have been the death knell to a wide 
range of individual claims. Moreover, (at least according to the 
majority) the plaintiffs failed to prove their thesis prior to certification. 
One would think that the better approach to failure of proof would 
be to decertify the class if the common questions no longer 
predominated. Rule 23(c)(1)(C) would seem ideally suited to that 
task.170 But it is not clear how this refinement of predominance will 
advance the principles of due process. Refinement seems much more 
likely to clutter certification with an unnecessary doctrinal complexity. 
We do agree that this form of failure-of-all-claims predominance is 
sufficient to justify certification, but it doesn’t follow that it should be 
necessary. 
8. Jennings v. Rodriguez
The precise issue presented in Jennings v. Rodriguez was whether
aliens who have been detained pending immigration removal 
proceedings for longer than six months have a right to a bond 
hearing.171 Rodriguez, who was so detained, joined other similarly 
situated detainees and sought certification of a class to challenge the 
practice on constitutional and statutory grounds.172 The district court 
denied certification, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.173 
On remand, the district court certified the following class (naming 
Rodriguez as the class representative): 
[A]ll non-citizens within the Central District of California who: (1) 
are or were detained for longer than six months pursuant to one of the 
general immigration detention statutes pending completion of 
removal proceedings, including judicial review, (2) are not and have 
not been detained pursuant to a national security detention statute, 
and (3) have not been afforded a hearing to determine whether their 
detention is justified.174  
170 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C) (“An order that grants or denies class certification may 
be altered or amended before final judgment.”). 
171 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). 
172 Id. at 838. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 838–39. 
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The district court also approved subclasses corresponding to each of 
the four statutes under which the class members were being detained—
8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) (inadmissible at arrival), 1226(a) (detained as 
inadmissible while in the United States), 1226(c) (legally in the United 
States but removable by virtue of having committed a specified crime), 
and 1231(a) (in process of removal, but not subject to a final removal 
order).175 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the certification of the 
overall class and the first three of the four subclasses.176  
On the merits, the district court upheld the claim and entered a 
permanent injunction against the government, which required a bond 
hearing for those detainees held over six months.177 The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed and, in doing so, applied the canon of constitutional avoidance 
and interpreted the relevant immigration statutes as providing the right 
to a bond hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, finding no such 
statutory right,178 and remanded to the Ninth Circuit for consideration 
of Rodriguez’s constitutional claim.179 In remanding, the Court 
instructed the Ninth Circuit to reconsider the question of class 
certification.180 Specifically, the Court instructed the Ninth Circuit to 
first decide whether it continues to have jurisdiction despite 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(f)(1). Under that provision, “no court (other than the Supreme
Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the 
operation of [§§ 1221–1232] other than with respect to the 
application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom 
proceedings under such part have been initiated.” Section 1252(f)(1) 
thus “prohibits federal courts from granting classwide injunctive 
relief against the operation of §§ 1221–123[2].” The Court of 
Appeals held that this provision did not affect its jurisdiction over 
respondents’ statutory claims because those claims did not “seek to 
enjoin the operation of the immigration detention statutes, but to 
enjoin conduct . . . not authorized by the statutes.” This reasoning 
does not seem to apply to an order granting relief on constitutional 
grounds, and therefore the Court of Appeals should consider on 
remand whether it may issue classwide injunctive relief based on 
respondents’ constitutional claims. If not, and if the Court of Appeals 
concludes that it may issue only declaratory relief, then the Court of 
175 Id. at 389. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 842–48. 
179 Id. at 851. 
180 Id. The Court also instructed the Ninth Circuit to consider whether 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(f)(1) divested the Ninth Circuit of jurisdiction now that the statutory issue had been 
resolved against the plaintiff.  
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Appeals should decide whether that remedy can sustain the class on 
its own. 
The Court of Appeals should also consider whether a Rule 
23(b)(2) class action continues to be the appropriate vehicle for 
respondents’ claims in light of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 
U.S. 338 (2011). We held in Dukes that “Rule 23(b)(2) applies only 
when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide 
relief to each member of the class.” That holding may be relevant on 
remand because the Court of Appeals has already acknowledged that 
some members of the certified class may not be entitled to bond 
hearings as a constitutional matter. Assuming that is correct, then it 
may no longer be true that the complained-of “‘conduct is such that 
it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class 
members or as to none of them.’” 
Similarly, the Court of Appeals should also consider on remand 
whether a Rule 23(b)(2) class action litigated on common facts is an 
appropriate way to resolve respondents’ Due Process Clause claims. 
“[D]ue process is flexible,” we have stressed repeatedly, and it “calls 
for such procedural protections as the particular situation 
demands.”181 
The Court’s first instruction raises questions pertaining to the 
jurisdictional scope of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1),182 which places limits on 
the availability of injunctive relief in certain specific removal 
proceedings. While the Court observed that (f)(1) “prohibits federal 
courts from granting classwide injunctive relief against the operation 
of”  those removal proceedings,183 the text of (f)(1) doesn’t literally say 
that, and the Court has never so held. The plaintiffs, in their 
supplemental brief to the Ninth Circuit, focused on the text of (f)(1), 
which, after seeming to prohibit all injunctive relief by courts other 
than the U.S. Supreme Court, creates an exception where an injunction 
is sought by an “individual alien against whom proceedings under such 
181 Id. at 851–52 (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit directed the parties to file 
supplemental briefs on the above question as well as on the underlying constitutional issue. 
Rodriguez v. Jennings, 887 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2018).  
182 The text of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) provides: 
Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of the identity of the party or 
parties bringing the action, no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have 
jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of part 
IV of this subchapter, as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, other than with respect to the application 
of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such 
part have been initiated. 
183 See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 851 (quoting Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 481 (1999)). 
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part have been initiated.”184 From this, the plaintiffs argued that 
classwide injunctive relief is available when removal proceedings have 
been initiated against all named plaintiffs and class members, which 
was the case with respect to the Rodriguez class action.185 We could 
say that this is a classic due process efficiency and fairness 
interpretation of (f)(1). The government, however, disputed the 
plaintiff’s interpretation, focusing on the general intent behind the 
adoption of that provision, which was to bar injunctive relief by lower 
federal courts in all cases except those involving an individual 
proceeding.186 This question has less to do with class actions than it 
has to do with the perceived scope of (f)(1). For present purposes, we 
will presume that the government will prevail on this issue.  
With the above presumption in mind, the critical question as to the 
Court’s remand instructions is whether a (b)(2) class can seek 
corresponding declaratory relief consistent with (f)(1)’s bar on 
classwide injunctive relief.  
According to the 1966 Advisory Committee Notes, “Declaratory 
relief ‘corresponds’ to injunctive relief when as a practical matter it 
affords injunctive relief or serves as a basis for later injunctive 
relief.”187 We are aware of no dispute over this definition. Consistent 
with this, the plaintiffs plausibly argued that classwide declaratory 
relief would correspond to injunctive relief since individual detainees 
could use a declaration establishing the unconstitutionality of 
prolonged detention without a bond hearing as the basis for an 
injunction preventing the government from denying a timely bond 
hearing on a case-by-case basis.188 Importantly, since (f)(1) permits 
injunctions sought by individuals against whom proceedings have been 
initiated, the availability of declaratory relief would appear to be 
wholly consistent with the statutory scheme as it would allow the 
individual, relying on the declaration, to seek an injunction ordering 
such a hearing. It would also conform with the norm of due process to 
the extent that it promotes efficiency and fairness by resolving the 
critical question in one formal proceeding. The government, however, 
did not address this question, relying instead on the law of the case 
184 Petitioners-Appellees Supplemental Brief at 7–10, Rodriguez v. Robbins, 803 F.3d 
502 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 13-56706 & 13-56755) [hereinafter PASB]. 
185 Id. 
186 Respondents-Appellants’ Corrected Supplemental Brief at 12–15, Rodriguez v. 
Marin, 909 F.3d 252 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 13-56706 & 13-56755) [hereinafter RACS]. 
187 1966 Amendments, supra note 33, at 102. 
188 PASB, supra note 184, at 14–18. 
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since the panel had previously held that the award of declaratory relief 
would be inconsistent with (f)(1).189  
The second paragraph of the Court’s instructions seemed to invite a 
broad inquiry into what we might call the unitary relief principle 
described in Wal-Mart v. Dukes. But read in its entirety, the paragraph 
is more precisely focused on the entry fiction—a legal fiction under 
which noncitizens seeking entry into the United States and detained 
within the United States are treated as remaining at the border and, 
therefore, beyond the protection of the Constitution.190 To mask this 
fiction as presenting a Rule 23(b)(2) issue speaks volumes about this 
Court. In any event, Justice Breyer’s dissent forcefully and 
persuasively exposed the vulgarity of the fiction.191 In any event, this 
fiction would only apply to one of the three subclasses—the subclass 
designated under § 1225(b) (inadmissible on arrival). Even a court that 
wanted to entertain the fiction might find additional space for providing 
basic due process protections to those subject to the entry fiction. 
189 RACS, supra note 186, at 15 n.1. 
190 Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 2015) (describing the fiction 
and its consequences), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). 
191 In Justice Breyer’s words: 
It is clear that the Fifth Amendment’s protections extend to “all persons within the 
territory of the United States.” But the Government suggests that those protections 
do not apply to asylum seekers or other arriving aliens because the law treats 
arriving aliens as if they had never entered the United States; hence they are not 
held within its territory. 
This last-mentioned statement is, of course, false. All of these noncitizens are 
held within the territory of the United States at an immigration detention facility. 
Those who enter at JFK airport are held in immigration detention facilities in, e.g., 
New York; those who arrive in El Paso are held in, e.g., Texas. At most one might 
say that they are “constructively” held outside the United States: the word 
“constructive” signaling that we indulge in a “legal fiction,” shutting our eyes to 
the truth. But once we admit to uttering a legal fiction, we highlight, we do not 
answer, the relevant question: Why should we engage in this legal fiction here? 
The legal answer to this question is clear. We cannot here engage in this legal 
fiction. No one can claim, nor since the time of slavery has anyone to my 
knowledge successfully claimed, that persons held within the United States are 
totally without constitutional protection. Whatever the fiction, would the 
Constitution leave the Government free to starve, beat, or lash those held within 
our boundaries? If not, then, whatever the fiction, how can the Constitution 
authorize the Government to imprison arbitrarily those who, whatever we might 
pretend, are in reality right here in the United States? The answer is that the 
Constitution does not authorize arbitrary detention. And the reason that is so is 
simple: Freedom from arbitrary detention is as ancient and important a right as any 
found within the Constitution’s boundaries. 
Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 862–63 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citation 
omitted). 
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The final and crucial paragraph for our purposes instructs the Ninth 
Circuit to consider whether a class action unified by common facts 
provides an appropriate vehicle for the resolution of due process 
claims. The subtextual implication is that due process is inherently 
flexible and, therefore, not amenable to a singular, class-based 
resolution. This is nonsense and bespeaks a fundamental 
misunderstanding of due process.  
It is true that due process is flexible. And it is equally true that 
fairness, reasonableness, and efficiency are dependent on the specific 
circumstances of the case and invite a balancing of interests.192 Notice 
satisfactory in one context might not be satisfactory in another. But it 
does not follow that due process is ad hoc or that it is sized to fit only 
one occasion. From a fairness perspective, due process presumes that 
similarly situated persons under similar circumstances should be 
subject to the same established standards. Reasonableness and 
efficiency suggest that the context should inform the contours of the 
applicable standard. Thus, the minimum contacts standard of personal 
jurisdiction is uniform across the spectrum in which it applies—
purposeful contacts, relatedness, and reasonableness—but is also 
sufficiently flexible to adapt to a range of circumstances.193 Here, the 
Court seems completely unmoored from the constitutional principle 
when it suggests that flexible due process may not be the appropriate 
common question for class certification. 
The correct question in Jennings is not whether due process claims 
can be resolved in a common-facts class action, but whether in this 
particular class action, with three specified subclasses, a court can 
fashion a due process standard that is sufficiently comprehensive to 
define the scope of the right for all class or subclass members. The due 
process standard should be sufficiently comprehensive to 
accommodate the common contention and to resolve the question as to 
whether the detainees are entitled to a bond hearing after six months in 
detention. Of course, it’s worth noting that the right asserted is to 
receive a hearing, not to obtain immediate release. Hence, the right 
affords the government an opportunity to explain why any particular 
detainee should not be entitled to a bond. 
The core principle of our rule-of-law system is due process. A civil 
rights class action pursuing due process represents the quintessence of 
192 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). 
193 See ALLAN IDES, CHRISTOPHER N. MAY & SIMONA GROSSI, CIVIL PROCEDURE: 
CASES AND PROBLEMS 115–243 (5th ed. 2016) (detailing the law of personal jurisdiction). 
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that principle. The Jennings Court seemed to have lost sight of that 
simple fact. 
9. Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert
At issue in Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert194 was whether Rule
23(f)’s fourteen-day limitation on filing a petition for permission to 
appeal is subject to equitable tolling.195 The Court unanimously held 
that Rule 23(f) was not subject to equitable tolling, relying largely on 
the text of the federal rules, both civil and appellate, and on analogous 
precedent.  
The district court in Nutraceutical ordered decertification of a class. 
Ten days after entry of that order, the plaintiff informed the court that 
he planned to file a motion for reconsideration. The court gave him ten 
more days to file that motion and the plaintiff followed the court’s 
instructions. Once the motion was filed, the court took it under 
advisement and entered an order denying that motion three months 
later. Within fourteen days of that order, the plaintiff filed a Rule 23(f) 
petition for permission to appeal. The court of appeals granted the 
petition, explaining that Rule 23(f)’s nonjurisdictional time frame was 
subject to equitable tolling under the circumstances presented.196 
The Supreme Court agreed that Rule 23(f) was nonjurisdictional.197 
And it agreed that had the plaintiff filed his motion for reconsideration 
within the fourteen-day time frame, the date on which that motion was 
denied would open a new fourteen-day window within which to file a 
petition for permission to appeal.198 The problem, according to the 
Court, was that although the plaintiff announced his intent to file a 
motion for reconsideration within fourteen days of the order 
decertifying the class, his motion was filed after the fourteen-day 
limitation to petition for permission to appeal had expired.199 
In declining to permit equitable tolling, the Court began and ended 
with the text of the rules. The Court noted that “the governing rules 
speak directly to the issue of Rule 23(f)’s flexibility and make clear that 
its deadline is not subject to equitable tolling.”200 This was because the 
text of Rule 23(f) expressly imposed a fourteen-day time frame within 
194 139 S. Ct. 710 (2019). 
195 Id. at 713. 
196 Lambert v. Nutraceutical Corp., 870 F.3d 1170, 1179–81 (9th Cir. 2017). 
197 Nutraceutical Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 714. 
198 Id. at 715. 
199 Id. at 715–16. 
200 Id. at 715. 
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which to file the petition, and although appellate Rule 26(b) allowed 
various court-ordered extensions of time, it expressly prohibited any 
extension “to file . . . a petition for permission to appeal.”201  
As to the scope of Rule 26(b), the plaintiff argued that the text of the 
rule was more nuanced in that it distinguished between extending the 
time within which to file a petition (an ex ante request to extend) and 
excusing the failure to file within the specified time frame (an ex post 
request to excuse). In fact, the text of the rule expressly prohibits only 
the former—the ex ante request—and would, by inference, seem to 
permit the latter.202 The Court did not disagree with the plaintiff’s 
reading of the text but concluded that any such reading was precluded 
by a 1960 decision construing the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.203 The Court did not say that this prior decision was 
correctly decided. Rather, it simply said that the question had been 
decided in an analogous context, eliding any discussion of the merits 
of the plaintiff’s contention or of the previous decision. 
The Court also declined to decide two purely legal issues that the 
lower court did not address. The first issue was whether the timeliness 
of the plaintiff’s motion to reconsider caused the petition filing time to 
run from the order denying that motion—as it would if he had filed the 
motion to reconsider within fourteen days of the initial order 
decertifying the class. The second issue was whether the district court’s 
order denying the motion to reconsider was itself “an order granting or 
denying class-certification” within the meaning of Rule 23(f).204 Both 
were purely legal questions that could be answered without reference 
to any particular set of facts. 
From a due process perspective, one might argue that the Court 
simply read the rules and applied them, thus adhering to the law and 
conforming its decision to the idea of due process. Of course, we praise 
a careful reading and enforcement of the rules’ text. But a due process 
reading of the text should always begin with or be informed by the idea 
of due process—that is to say, justice that is reasonably, fairly, and 
efficiently pursued. That idea is embodied in Rule 1 and ought to 
permeate the interpretation of every rule.205 Moreover, the notion that 
201 Id. (quoting FED. R. APP. P. 26(b)(1)). 
202 Id. at 714. 
203 Id. (citing United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220 (1960)). 
204 Id. 
205 FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and 
proceedings in the United States district courts, except as stated in Rule 81. They should be 
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equitable principles ought not to be applied to the application of a 
federal rule is counterintuitive. The idea of equity is a product of due 
process, designed to provide justice where the law has failed to do so. 
The Court attended to none of this. It read the sanitized rule and 
purported to apply it, presumably on the umpire theory of judicial 
decision-making. 
The plaintiff’s effort to distinguish between extensions and excusals 
did evoke due process. It suggested a complementary reading of Rules 
23(f) and 26(b), one that offered the type of due-process flexibility Rule 
1 invites. The argument certainly merited something more than the 
Court’s observation that the question had been decided adversely over 
fifty years ago in an analogous context. Because the text of the rule 
distinguishes between extensions and excusals, a consideration of the 
idea of due process might have helped the Court understand why the 
text does so.  
The facts here strongly suggest that the fair, just, and most efficient 
resolution of this case would have been to allow the petition to be filed. 
But the Court said, in essence, that the road was previously paved 
otherwise, and it would not look beneath the surface. 
Similarly, the Court’s refusal to consider the plaintiff’s other 
arguments—both of which raised pure questions of law and were 
inherently part of the case—also runs counter to the idea of due process. 
It is certainly not clear to us how the court of appeals is in any better 
position to decide these questions than was the Supreme Court. The 
principle that the lower courts should be the first to consider an issue is 
a salutary, general principle of judicial practice. But the Court only 
adheres to that principle unless it doesn’t want to. It shouldn’t have 
wanted to here.  
The plaintiff’s first alternative argument was that a timely motion to 
reconsider deflects the time frame for petitioning for permission to 
appeal to the date on which that motion is resolved. That argument is 
merely another way of applying the concept of equity to the 
interpretation of Rule 23(f). It’s less ad hoc than a fairness-under-the-
circumstances approach, but it rests on the same principles of justice 
and efficiency. Hence, the Court could have said one reason for 
denying equitable tolling was that equity was built in the rule whenever 
a plaintiff files a timely motion to reconsider a denial of class 
certification. 
construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”). 
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We would say that the decision in Nutraceutical disserves the idea 
of due process in at least three ways. First, it begins with the text and 
not with the idea of due process behind the text, treating the text as a 
stand-alone value. Second, it endorses an interpretation of the text that 
is largely compelled by reference to an analogous decision that was 
neither defended nor assessed in the Nutraceutical decision. Third, it 
fails to complete the task of interpretation, relying on a standard that is 
routinely ignored in the Court’s common practices. Thus, while the 
Court’s opinion has the patina of textual rationality, it fails to advance 
the mission of due process in an apparent effort to achieve unanimity 
and dispose of the case. 
10. China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh
In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, the Supreme Court 
held that the timely filing of a class action tolled the statute of 
limitations for all putative class members.206 It further held that 
members of a failed class action could intervene in that proceeding as 
individual plaintiffs after the denial of class certification. The Court 
clarified the American Pipe standard in Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. 
Parker,207 where it held that such putative class members need not 
intervene in the pending suit to benefit from equitable tolling but could 
instead file independent actions asserting the same underlying claim.  
The question presented in China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh208 was 
whether the members of a failed class could file a subsequent class 
action, as opposed to an individual suit, if that class action would 
otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. In other words, the 
question was whether the principle of equitable tolling would permit 
the filing of successive and otherwise barred class actions once class 
certification is denied in the initial tolling proceeding. The Court held 
that the principle did not permit filing under those circumstances.209 
In so holding, the Court employed what one might call a partial due-
process analysis, focusing exclusively on the efficiency component of 
the principle. In the Court’s words,  
The “efficiency and economy of litigation” that support tolling of 
individual claims, do not support maintenance of untimely successive 
class actions; any additional class filings should be made early on, 
206 414 U.S. 538 (1974). 
207 462 U.S. 345, 353–54 (1983). 
208 138 S. Ct. 1800, 1804 (2018). 
209 Id. 
2020] The Modern Law of Class Actions and Due Process 97
soon after the commencement of the first action seeking class 
certification. 
American Pipe tolls the limitation period for individual claims 
because economy of litigation favors delaying those claims until after 
a class-certification denial. If certification is granted, the claims will 
proceed as a class and there would be no need for the assertion of any 
claim individually. If certification is denied, only then would it be 
necessary to pursue claims individually. 
With class claims, on the other hand, efficiency favors early 
assertion of competing class representative claims. If class treatment 
is appropriate, and all would-be representatives have come forward, 
the district court can select the best plaintiff with knowledge of the 
full array of potential class representatives and class counsel. And if 
the class mechanism is not a viable option for the claims, the decision 
denying certification will be made at the outset of the case, litigated 
once for all would-be class representatives.210 
In support of this assessment, the Court cited recent amendments to 
Rule 23(c) that endorse the efficiency rationale.211 
On a superficial level, the Court’s decision feels right. But in a 
concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor convincingly argues that the 
Court may have overplayed the efficiency rationale to the detriment of 
fairness. To that end, she proposes a more limited standard: 
Instead of adopting a blanket no-tolling-of-class-claims-ever rule . . . 
the Court might hold, as a matter of equity, that tolling only becomes 
unavailable for future class claims where class certification is denied 
for a reason that bears on the suitability of the claims for class 
treatment. Where, by contrast, class certification is denied because of 
the deficiencies of the lead plaintiff as class representative, or 
because of some other nonsubstantive defect, tolling would remain 
available.212 
The driving force behind this alternative standard is fairness to the 
putative class members. As Justice Sotomayor sees it, the Court’s 
approach may well lead to the filing of multiple parallel class actions 
with the potential adverse consequence of a strategic drive to the 
bottom in settlement negotiations: 
[T]he existence of multiple putative class actions covering the same 
harm to the same class may lead to a “race toward judgment or 
settlement.” Each class lawyer knows that only the lawyers in the 
first-resolved case will get paid, because the other suits will then be 
dismissed on claim-preclusion grounds. Defense lawyers know this, 
210 Id. at 1806–07 (citation omitted). 
211 Id. at 1807. 
212 Id. at 1814 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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too, so they are “able to engage in a ‘reverse auction,’ pitting the 
various class counsel against one another and agreeing to settle with 
the lawyer willing to accept the lowest bid on behalf of the class.” 
This gamesmanship is not in class members’ interest, nor in the 
interest of justice.213 
If, as we have asserted, the aim of due process is justice reasonably, 
fairly, and efficiently pursued, then the majority’s obeisance to 
efficiency falls one step short of the idea of due process by failing to 
account for the potential unfairness of its across-the-board standard. 
We might say it’s easy to apply but difficult to justify as a matter of 
complete due process. Surely Justice Sotomayor was attempting to 
correct that unfairness. But at the very least, the Court should have 
adopted a standard that contemplated the potential unfairness of 
denying equitable tolling in contexts not precisely covered by the case 
pending before it, such as those noted by Justice Sotomayor. 
CONCLUSION 
The goal of this Article is to reboot the law of class actions with the 
aim of allowing Rule 23 to reach its full potential as a tool of collective 
dispute resolution consistent with due process. The idea of due process 
is a promise of adherence to the rule of law tempered by 
reasonableness, fairness, and efficiency. It embraces both the value of 
individual autonomy and the collective interests of the community. The 
idea of class actions, premised on due process, is to provide a pragmatic 
method of dispute resolution that is fair to the individual and responsive 
to the needs of the community and the challenges generated by widely 
spread and shared harms. In this respect, class actions operate as a tool 
of democracy. Rule 23 should be interpreted from this hopeful and 
effective perspective—one that balances individual autonomy against 
the legitimate needs of the community. Instead, the Rule appears to be 
infused with its framers’ self-doubts and the Supreme Court’s treatment 
of it as an unwelcome guest in the home of traditional litigation forms. 
We hope that our analysis will provide helpful insight for a reformed 
interpretation and application of Rule 23 that will allow it to fulfill its 
democratic function. 
213 Id. at 1814–15 (citing Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 
461 (2000)). 
